Anonymous
Author
Identity &
Verification
System
Proposal: Anonymous Author Identity and Verification System for AES-451
Overview In repressive environments, writers risk harassment, arrest, and worse for publishing the truth. Many are forced to abandon their work or publish anonymously—at the cost of legitimacy, recognition, and impact. The AES-451 identity system aims to solve this by allowing writers to use assumed names while building the same trust, continuity, and authority typically granted to those who publish under their real identities.
This system will empower writers to:
- Publish anonymously, yet credibly
- Prove their authorship securely
- Communicate with journalists and researchers
- Protect themselves and their wider networks from exposure
Core Goals
- Establish trust between anonymous writers and their audience
- Ensure authenticity of content
- Provide verifiable identity for journalists and researchers
- Preserve anonymity even under device seizure or coercion
- Enable writers to build a long-term pseudonymous presence with the authority of a real-name identity
System Summary
The AES-451 identity system is a lightweight, cryptography-based framework that lets writers sign their work, control who can view private identity details, and authenticate their authorship through a secure, browser-based or offline process.
Key features:
- Public/private key pairs generated client-side
- Posts are signed with a secure PIN (never stored)
- Optional distress PINs trigger silent deauthorization
- Profile sharing permissions embedded per recipient (via email-based access tokens)
- Recipient verification through email confirmation
- Manual or portal-based submission of content and authentication files
- No server-side storage of private keys, metadata, or IPs
Each signature file (e.g. .a451
) is uniquely tied to the specific content it accompanies. The system creates a cryptographic hash of the content, which is then digitally signed using the writer’s private key. This ensures that:
- The content has not been altered
- The content was authored by the pseudonym holder
- The recipient can verify the signature using the public key linked to the pseudonym
User Experience: Writers
- Writer signs into a secure local tool or web app
- They upload or paste their content
- They enter their pseudonym and secure PIN
- The system generates a signature file (e.g. .a451) that proves authorship and binds it to the content
- Optionally, they add a journalist’s email to allow profile access (one-time encrypted token)
- They either:
- Download the signature + email it manually
- Use a secure email tool built into the system
If under duress, a distress PIN creates a silent alert signature (for backend monitoring).
User Experience: Journalists/Researchers
- Receive a signed post + .a451 file
- Visit a verification portal (or use offline verification)
- Upload the signature file and the original content
- Log in or create an account, verifying their email
- If granted access, they can view:
- Writer’s pseudonym
- Post authenticity
- Profile details (if permissioned)
- If access was granted via token, and email is verified, access is granted seamlessly
Identity Verification Methods While the core system uses cryptographic keys for consistency and verification, initial identity validation can happen through multiple trusted methods:
- Video verification (via Signal):
- The writer sends a short video showing their face and holding ID to a trusted administrator
- Video is immediately deleted after confirmation and never stored
- Trusted authenticator system:
- A known and verified individual (journalist, editor, project lead) vouches for the writer
- Similar to a “web of trust”
These methods ensure that although the pseudonym is fake, the person behind it is real and in the location or situation they claim.
Case Examples
- A writer in Afghanistan publishes an essay about life under Taliban rule. She signs it with her AES-451 ID, allowing journalists to verify that the content came from a consistent, trusted pseudonym. She also allows profile access to one specific journalist, who sees she has been verified through an authenticator.
- A writer in Egypt shares leaked documents about surveillance abuses. He uploads them with a distress PIN, triggering a silent flag. A researcher authenticates the post and notes that it was signed under duress. They contact a trusted liaison for safety follow-up.
- A researcher receives three stories from different “unknown” pseudonyms. Two fail verification. One shows a long history of verified, signed posts under the same key, endorsed by two known writers. This is the one they trust.
Why We Need This In regimes that criminalize truth-telling, anonymity is survival. But anonymity without credibility leads to dismissal. This system offers a way to preserve the protective layer of pseudonymity while restoring the legitimacy and continuity of a name.
It allows writers to build careers, collaborate, and publish without compromise. And it allows journalists and researchers to engage with the work without fear of being misled or manipulated.
This system makes that possible, without requiring writers to trust anyone with their real identity—not even us.
Next Steps We are seeking:
- Cryptographers and developers to help build the client-side tools
- Human rights technologists to stress-test threat models
- Journalists and researchers to help design the verification UX
- Writers and editors to test and refine the flow
We are building this for those who cannot afford mistakes. It needs to be simple, strong, and silent. But most of all, it needs to work.