Tracking Writers in the Digital Age

Modern surveillance does not always rely on reading the words a writer has published. Increasingly, it works by identifying the writer themselves — tracking where they go, who they meet, and what they use. This page explains how writers, publishers, and journalists are digitally tracked and monitored, and outlines the tactics used by repressive regimes to control them.

Digital Fingerprinting and Online Tracking

Digital fingerprinting is the practice of identifying and tracking a device based on its unique technical characteristics, rather than relying on cookies or account logins.

It is one of the most persistent and difficult-to-evade methods of surveillance available to both governments and private companies.

A typical fingerprinting scan will collect dozens of data points, including:

  • Browser
  • Platform
  • Language Preferences
  • Timezone
  • CPU and RAM
  • Touch Support
  • Screen Resolution and Available Screen Size
  • Color Depth and Pixel Ratio
  • Cookies and Do Not Track
  • WebGL Renderer and GPU Model
  • WebRTC Internal IP Leak
  • Fonts Detected
  • Audio Fingerprinting
  • Device Guess

Each of these details may seem minor individually, but when combined, they form a signature as distinctive as a fingerprint.

Once created, this fingerprint can be used to track a writer across websites, networks, and even anonymity tools, without their knowledge.

How writers can defend themselves:

  • Use browsers designed to resist fingerprinting (such as Tor Browser or Mullvad Browser)
  • Disable WebRTC where possible
  • Minimise browser extensions and installed fonts
  • Keep JavaScript disabled when safe to do so
  • Avoid customising browser settings that make your system stand out
  • Regularly update your software
  • Location: Worldwide
  • Most at risk: Writers, journalists, activists, researchers, general public

Device Seizure and Forensic Analysis

Authorities may seize laptops, phones, and storage devices at borders, checkpoints, or during raids.

Specialised forensic tools such as Cellebrite and GrayKey can extract deleted files, account information, location history, and message contents from a seized device.

How writers can defend themselves:

  • Use full-disk encryption
  • Prefer passwords over biometric unlocking
  • Store sensitive drafts on external encrypted drives
  • Consider dual-password systems that unlock decoy environments
  • Location: Worldwide
  • Most at risk: Writers, journalists, students, human rights defenders

Stingrays and IMSI Catchers

IMSI catchers (stingrays) impersonate mobile towers, tricking phones into connecting and revealing data like call logs, metadata, and even encrypted messages.

Often used near protests, airports, or sensitive locations.

How writers can defend themselves:

  • Turn phones off or use airplane mode during sensitive activity
  • Remove apps that track location
  • Use anonymous SIMs where possible
  • Avoid logging into personal accounts while abroad
  • Location: Worldwide
  • Most at risk: Protesters, journalists, organisers, dissidents

Malware and Spyware Attacks

Governments deploy spyware to compromise devices remotely. Tools like Pegasus or Predator can steal messages, audio, camera data, and files silently.

How writers can defend themselves:

  • Keep devices and software updated
  • Use fewer apps
  • Avoid suspicious links or unexpected messages
  • Use a separate "clean" device for critical work
  • Reinstall your OS regularly
  • Location: Middle East, Africa, Europe, Asia
  • Most at risk: Journalists, political writers, researchers, exiles

Metadata Collection and Cloud Account Compromise

Metadata — who contacted whom, when, for how long — remains exposed even with encrypted messages.

Governments or companies may access accounts via phishing or legal orders.

How writers can defend themselves:

  • Use strong, unique passwords
  • Enable app-based 2FA
  • Avoid storing sensitive documents in the cloud
  • Use decentralised or encrypted platforms
  • Location: Worldwide
  • Most at risk: Writers, researchers, students, human rights workers

Deep Packet Inspection and VPN Blocking

DPI allows authorities to analyse and censor internet traffic — blocking VPNs, identifying Tor use, and intercepting communications.

How writers can defend themselves:

  • Use obfuscated VPNs
  • Use Tor bridges with pluggable transports
  • Watch for certificate errors
  • Spread sensitive work across devices and networks
  • Location: Iran, China, Russia, Gulf States
  • Most at risk: Writers, students, activists, technologists

Mass Surveillance in Public Spaces

Facial recognition, phone triangulation, and camera networks are increasingly used to monitor public activity — including cultural events and writer meetings.

How writers can defend themselves:

  • Change meeting routes and locations regularly
  • Avoid carrying traceable personal devices
  • Understand local surveillance laws and rights
  • Location: Worldwide (esp. urban areas)
  • Most at risk: Writers, organisers, publishers, student leaders

Institutional and Academic Monitoring

Writers may be monitored by universities, publishers, or cultural bodies — often under government pressure or voluntary cooperation.

How writers can defend themselves:

  • Don’t use institutional platforms for sensitive topics
  • Keep personal and work files separate
  • Build private trusted networks outside of official structures
  • Location: Worldwide
  • Most at risk: Students, academics, publishers, cultural workers

Legal Pressure and Coercion

Laws on cybercrime or national security are used to criminalise dissenting writing. Forced password disclosure and threats to family are common.

How writers can defend themselves:

  • Keep little to no sensitive data on-device
  • Use secure, offline backups
  • Arrange trusted emergency contacts
  • Location: Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Belarus, Myanmar
  • Most at risk: Journalists, political writers, exiles, legal advocates

Psychological Warfare and Disinformation Campaigns

Writers may be discredited using fake leaks, bot harassment, deepfakes, or honeytraps. The goal is to silence through chaos or fear.

How writers can defend themselves:

  • Be cautious online with unknown contacts
  • Log any attacks or suspicious messages
  • Don’t engage with trolls or hostile bot accounts
  • Location: Worldwide
  • Most at risk: Writers, journalists, influencers, human rights defenders